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ICU Intensive care unit 
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NHSN National Healthcare Safety Network 
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Healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) 
 
Frederic Maximilian Eysell 
 
Summary: 
 
Healthcare-associated infections affect over 4 million patients in Europe each year. 
The European Center for Diseases Prevention and Control (ECDC) has taken many 
steps tp improve patient care by collecting surveillance data across Europe to identify 
key areas and improve educational material for healthcare workers and patients. But 
the ECDC has undergone major structural changes in the last two decades, which 
have impacted its modus operandi and reach. These changes make it challenging to 
review the data available.  
The European prevalence of healthcare-associated infections seems to be around 
7.6% and the most common HCAIs were Pneumonia, surgical site infections, urinary 
tract infections and bloodstream infections, with a 90th percentile rate of device-
association. Especially in the ICU infection rates are dramatically high, with 20% of 
patients acquiring an infection. The high HCAI prevalence in ICUs can be explained 
by poor adherence to hygiene guidelines and the frequent usage of invasive devices, 
which significantly increases the risk of acquiring an infection. While the overall rate 
of surgical-site infection is decreasing, colon surgery has still the highest incidence of 
SSI and a reduction of infections in colon surgery has to be a prime concern with the 
solution eventually being set forth in some of the national guidelines. 
There are plenty of areas where prevention programmes can be put in place and 
maybe it requires stronger policies to drastically reduce infection rates, especially in 
ICUs. 
Unfortunately, the data about HCAIs in long-term care facilities were too poor to yield 
conclusive results on a European level. 
But the number of national and international prevention programmes is increasing; 
especially in the light of increasing antimicrobial resistance, it is realized that 
improved prevention and guidelines for the use of antibiotics is preferableto waiting 
for a novel antibiotic to “save the day”. 	  
 
Key terms: Healthcare-associated infection, ECDC, Antimicrobial, Surveillance, 
Prevention
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1. Introduction 
 
While a hospital is a place where patients expect to get better, it also harbors the 
thread of infection. Ignatz Semmelweis was amongst the first to recognize this in the 
1850s, but it took decades to discover the full spectrum of the problem. Today, the 
basic scientific facts about infectious diseases and hygiene are “common knowledge” 
and thanks to the discoveries and inventions of the last two centuries infectious 
diseases have seen a dramatic decline in the public. The American Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) itself acknowledged that by shifting its main focus from 
infectious to chronic diseases.  
 
Though the overall situation seems to be positive, it is in hospitals and other 
healthcare facilities, that infections pose a major burden to the western society. 
Healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) are the most frequent adverse effect in 
medical care worldwide. While advancements in prevention, treatment and 
surveillance have been made, the fight is far from over. Especially in low-and middle-
income countries, where funds are too small to support an all-encompassing 
surveillance system, HCAIs are more prevalent than in high-income countries. 
 
Therefore this review focuses on the high-income countries of the EU, where such 
systems have been established, in order to provide a clear picture of the problem in 
modern health care. 
In so doing, this paper presents the most common causative agents of HCAIs and 
explains what contributes to their persistence. This is followed by a brief overview of 
the impact of the problem in the observed countries. Furthermore it is intended to 
shed light into how the issue of infection is dealt with and how effective these 
measures are in practice. 
 
The evidence supporting this review was collected from studies and systematic 
reviews published in scientific literature from 1915 to 2015. 
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Methods 
 
The author first defined the focus of this work by confining the review of scientific 
literature to articles concerning high-income European countries and written in 
English language in between 1915 and 2015. Another confinement were the areas of 
healthcare, such as hospitals but especially surgery, intensive care & long term care 
facilities. Furthermore, the types of infections were limited to bloodstream infections, 
urinary tract infections, ventilator-associated pneumonia and surgical site infections.  
Search-engines used were Pub Med, Medline, Cochrane Library and Google. 
 
 
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do 
not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the author.  
All reasonable precautions have been taken by the author to verify the information 
contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed 
without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the 
interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event shall the author 
be liable for damages arising from its use. 
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2. Epidemiology 
 
2.1. History of definitions and surveillance of Healthcare-associated infections: 
First and foremost it is important to establish basic knowledge of key developments 
that lead to institutionalized definition and surveillance of HCAIs. In 1998, the 
European Parliament decided [1] that its member states should set up a network 
concerned with the prevention of major health problems and in particular 
communicable diseases (including nosocomial infections). The decision also 
mentioned, that this network should work in the fields of epidemiology, monitoring 
and surveillance, as well as control of communicable diseases. Furthermore it should 
establish uniform definitions and guidelines for its member states in order to achieve 
these tasks and the network should submit its first report within the next three years 
after the decision came into place on the first of January 1999. 
Out of this decision, the Hospital in Europe Link for Infections Control through 
Surveillance (HELICS) was created, which provided the first European union (EU) 
wide definitions of nosocomial infections (NI), nosocomical infections in the intensive 
care unit (NI ICU) and surgical-site infections (SSI) in the, so called, HELICS protocol 
[2].  
While these guidelines served as the basic standard for defining cases of HCAIs 
(then referred to as NIs), they also enabled all its member states to conduct 
surveillance and monitoring of communicable diseases in a uniform format and 
encouraged communication between members. 
In 2005, the network for Improving Patient Safety in Europe (IPSE) was created and 
it consisted of seven work packages covering areas of HCAI surveillance and control. 
One of these “packages” was HELICS. 
IPSE as such operated until July 2008 when it was transferred to the ECDC HAI-
Network (HAI-Net). 
A few months after the transition process, the “IPSE Technical implementation 
report” was released, showcasing the results of IPSE’s work from 2005 to 2008. The 
report highlighted the need to cover other types of NIs [3], harmonize national 
prevalence protocols, cover long-term care facilities, use mapping to highlight 
individual member state’s advances in infection control and to implement, harmonize 
and improve standards of training for infection control practitioners. 
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HAI-Net continued with HELICS/IPSE ‘s methods for the first two years until the 
creation of the ECDC’s own system, called “The European Surveillance System” 
(TESSy) in October 2010. 
This web-based system followed the IPSE’s, as well as the EU-council’s 
recommendations of June 2009 [4] and established a uniform, EU-wide protocol for 
point prevalence surveys of HCAIs. 
TESSy is an indicator-based surveillance system (discussed in 3.1.1.) used by the 
ECDC to yield annual epidemiological reports as well as multiannual disease-specific 
surveillance reports and peer-reviewed scientific articles. 
Besides TESSy, some of the former IPSE work-packages were outsourced to yield 
the “HCAI in long-term care facilities” (HALT)-project and the “Infection control 
training needs assessment in the European Union” (TRICE)-project in 2010. 
From 2011 to 2014, HALT was in its second iteration (HALT-2) and published its last 
annual report in May 2014[5]. TRICE published its guidance document for core 
competencies in 2014[6]. As of 2016, the institutions covering HCAIs are HAI-NET, 
ESAC-NET and EARS-NET (see chapter 3). 
 
With this in mind, it should be clear to the reader that there has been a significant 
shift in the institutions dealing with the subject and factors like member states, 
definitions, surveillance method and standards. While these changes have 
implications towards the data collected during the time in which they have been 
collected, as well as the countries and hospitals they have been collected in etc., it 
would lie outside the scope of this review to specifically highlight these changes.  
In general it has to be said, that the author uses the most up date versions of the 
ECDC protocols [7,8,9] as the source for HCAI-related definitions, as well as the 
ECDC annual reports [10,11,12] for epidemiological data. Furthermore it can not be 
stressed enough that the term “Healthcare-associated infection” or its abbreviation 
“HCAI” is synonymous with the terms “Nosocomial infection” or “NI”, “Hospital-
acquired infection”, “Hospital-associated infection” or the abbreviation “HAI” and will 
be used as the “to go” term to avoid any inconsistencies or confusion. 
 
 
 
 
    	  
	  	   5	  
2.2. Definitions 
The following definitions are taken from the HAIICU protocol V1.01 [7], the HAISSI 
protocol V1.2[8]  and the protocol for point prevalence surveys of HCAI and 
antimicrobial use in European long-term care facilities V.2014[9]. 
 
2.2.1. ICU-acquired and device-associated HCAI[7] 
Infections, that occur more than 48 hours after admission to the ICU are considered 
to be ICU acquired. 
Respectively, an HCAI is considered “device-associated” (DA), if a certain device 
was used during the treatment of the patient within the preceding 48 hours of the 
infection. This applies also, when the device was only used intermittently.   
Also, this only ever refers to bloodstream infections (BSI), pneumonia (PN) and 
urinary tract infections (UTI) in the ICU setting. The devices that fall into this definition 
are vascular and urinary catheters, as well as intubation devices (e.g. endotracheal 
tubes) [7]. 
 
2.2.2. Bloodstream infections [7] 
BSIs are considered to be HCAIs if:  
 
• The patient has at least one positive blood culture for a common skin 
contaminant*. 
      OR 
• The patient presents with at least one of the following: Fever (>38°C), chills 
and/or hypotension AND 2 positive blood cultures for a common skin 
contaminant* (from two different samples taken within 48 hours). 
 
*Common skin contaminants are considered to be: Coagulase-negative 
staphylococci, Micrococcus spp., Propionibacterium acnes, Bacillus spp. and 
Corynebacterium spp. 
 
Furthermore, BSIs can be sub-categorized into primary or secondary BSIs.  
• Primary BSIs include BSIs of unknown origin (origin could be verified but no 
source was found) and catheter-related BSIs (CR-BSI).  
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CR-BSIs are defined as such if the same microorganism has been cultured 
from both the blood and the catheter**.  
OR 
 
• The patient improves within 48 hours after removal of the catheter**. 
 
**The catheters considered are central-venous catheters (CVC), peripheral vascular 
catheters (PVC) and arterial catheters (ART). It has to be noted, that the ART 
category will be dropped or changed in the future[7].  
 
• Secondary BSIs are defined as such if the same micro-organism has been 
cultured from both the blood and another infection site.*** 
     OR 
• Strong clinical evidence supports, that the BSI was secondary to another 
infection site***, invasive diagnostic procedure or foreign body. 
 
***Infection sites can be pulmonary (PUL), digestive tract (DIG), surgical-site 
infections (SSI), urinary tract infections (UTI), skin and soft tissue (SST) or other 
(OTH) e.g. bone infections or central nervous system infections.    
 
2.2.3 Pneumonia (PN) [7] 
In order to have a diagnosis of PN, there are 3 diagnostic levels that need to be 
fulfilled. 
These are radiological, clinical (i.e. symptoms) and microbiological.  
 
Radiologically, PN is diagnosed if the ICU-patient has one definitive chest X-ray or  
CT-scan (2 or more suggestive images for patients with cardiac or pulmonary 
disease). 
 
Clinically, the patient needs to have at least one of the following: 
Fever above 38°C (with other causes excluded), leukopenia (< 4000 WBC/mm3) or  
leukocytosis (> 12 000 WBC/mm3). 
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Additionally, the patient needs to have at least one of the following: -­‐ New onset of purulent sputum, or change in character of sputum (color, odor, 
quantity,consistency).  -­‐ Cough, dyspnea or tachypnea  -­‐ Suggestive auscultation (rales or bronchial breath sounds), ronchi, wheezing  -­‐ Worsening gas exchange (e.g., O2 desaturation, increased oxygen 
requirements or increased ventilation demand). 
The definition of pneumonia is microbiologically subdivided into 5 categories (PN1 to 
PN 5) in order to allow for an encompassing comparison between all types of 
pneumonia within the TESSy network. 
  
PN1 corresponds to a  positive quantitative culture from minimally contaminated 
lower respiratory tract (LRT) specimen. 
This specimen could be a bronchoalveolar lavage(BAL) with more than 104 CFU/ml 
(or more than 5% of obtained cells contain intracellular bacteria when seen under 
direct microscopy). 
Furthermore, it could be  a protected brush (PB Wimberley) with more then  
103 CFU/ml or a distal protected aspirate (DPA) with a threshold of > 103 CFU/ml. 
 
PN2 corresponds to a  positive quantitative culture from a potentially contaminated 
LRT (e.g. endotracheal aspirate) specimen with more then 106 CFU/ml. 
 
PN3 corresponds to either:  -­‐ Positive blood culture not related to another source of infection -­‐ Positive growth in a culture of pleural fluid -­‐ Pleural or pulmonary abscess with positive needle aspiration -­‐ Histologic pulmonary exam shows evidence of pneumonia -­‐ Positive exams for viruses, Legionella, Aspergiullus, Mycoplasma, 
Mycobacteria, Pneumocystis carinii via detection of specific antigens, 
antibodies or a positive culture 
 
PN4 corresponds to a  positive sputum or non-quantitative LRT specimen culture. 
  
PN5 corresponds to the absence of a positive culture. 
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2.2.4. Urinary tract infection (UTI) [7,9]. 
There are two basic diagnostic categories of UTIs- those that are microbiologically 
confirmed (UTI-A) and those which are not (UTI-B). There has been a third category 
(UTI-C) for asymptomatic bacteriuria, which has now been removed from ICU-HCAI 
surveillance.  
 
UTI-A:  The patient has at least one of the following symptoms, with no other 
recognized cause:  
• Frequency 
• Urgency 
• Dysuria  
• Suprapubic tenderness  
• Fever > 38°C.  
• Additionally the patient has to have a positive urine culture with more than 105 
microorganisms per ml of urine but with no more than two different species of 
microorganisms. 
 
UTI-B: The patient has at least two of the following symptoms, with no other 
recognized cause:  
Frequency, urgency, dysuria, suprapubic tenderness or fever > 38°C.  
Furthermore, at least one of the following criteria need to be present:  
• A positive dipstick test for leukocyte esterase and/or nitrate 
•  A urine specimen with more then 10WBC/ml or more then 3WBC/ high-power 
field of unspun urine 
•  At least two urine cultures with repeated isolation of the same uropathogen 
(gram-negative bacteria or S. saprophyticus) with ≥ 102 colonies/ml urine in 
nonvoided specimens  
•   ≤105 colonies/ml of a single uropathogen (gram-negative bacteria or S. 
saprophyticus) in a patient being treated with effective antimicrobial agent for 
a urinary infection 
•  Diagnosis of a urinary tract infection  
• Appropriate therapy for a UTI  
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2.2.5. Catheter-related infections [7] 
There are three categories of catheter-related infections(CRIs) bases on the 
extend/spread of the infection (from local to systemic). The catheter in question is a 
CVC[14]. 
 
CRI1: Local CVC-related infection (no positive blood culture)  
• quantitative CVC culture >103 CFU/ml (3) or semi-quantitative CVC culture > 
15 CFU  
AND 
• pus/inflammation at the insertion site or tunnel  
CRI2: General CVC-related infection (no positive blood culture)  
• quantitative CVC culture >103  CFU/ml or semi-quantitative CVC culture > 15 
CFU  
 AND 
• clinical signs improve within 48 hours after catheter removal  
 
CRI3: microbiologically confirmed CVC-related bloodstream infection  
BSI occurring 48 hours before or after catheter removal and positive culture with the 
same micro-organism of either:  
• quantitative CVC culture >103 CFU/ml or semi-quantitative CVC culture > 15 
CFU  
• quantitative blood culture ratio CVC blood sample/peripheral blood sample> 5  
• differential delay of positivity of blood cultures: CVC blood sample culture 
positive 2 hours or more before peripheral blood culture (blood samples drawn 
at the same time)  
• positive culture with the same micro-organism from pus from insertion site  
 
2.2.6. Case definitions of surgical site infections[8,15] 
The definition[15] of  SSIs contains three basic categories: superficial incisional, deep 
incisional and organ/space related SSIs. 
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Superficial incisional SSI: 
Infection occurs within 30 days after the operation and involves only skin and 
subcutaneous tissue of the incision and at least one of the following: 
• purulent drainage with or without laboratory confirmation, from the superficial 
incision 
• organisms isolated from an aseptically obtained culture of fluid or tissue from 
the superficial incision 
 
• at least one of the following signs or symptoms of infection: pain or 
tenderness, localised swelling, redness or heat and superficial incision is 
deliberately opened by surgeon, unless incision is culture-negative 
• diagnosis of superficial incisional SSI made by a surgeon or attending 
physician. 
 
Deep incisional SSI: 
Infection occurs within 30 days after the operation if no implant is left in place or 
within one year if  an implant is in place and the infection appears to be related to the 
operation and the infection involves deep soft tissue (e.g. fascia, muscle etc.) of the 
incision and at least one of the following: 
• purulent drainage from the deep incision but not from the organ/space 
component of the surgical site 
• a deep incision spontaneously dehisces or is deliberately opened by a 
surgeon when the patient has at least one of the following signs or symptoms: 
fever (> 38° C), localised pain or tenderness, unless incision is culture-
negative 
• an abscess or other evidence of infection involving the deep incision is found 
on direct examination, during reoperation, or by histopathologic or radiologic 
examination; 
•    diagnosis of deep incisional SSI made by a surgeon or attending physician. 
 
 
 
 
 
    	  
	  	   11	  
Organ/ Space related SSI:  
Infection occurs within 30 days after the operation if no implant is left in place or 
within one year if an implant is in place and the infection appears to be related to the 
operation and  involves any part of the patient’s anatomy (e.g. organs and spaces) 
other than the incision that was opened or manipulated during an operation and at 
least one of the following: 
• purulent drainage from a drain that is placed through a stab wound into the 
organ/space 
• organisms isolated from an aseptically obtained culture of fluid or tissue in the 
organ/space 
• an abscess or other evidence of infection involving the organ/space that is 
found on direct examination, during reoperation, or by histopathologic or 
radiologic examination 
•    diagnosis of organ/space SSI made by a surgeon or attending physician 
 
2.2.7. Wound contamination class 
On a European level, the classification for wound contamination used is the one 
described by Altemeier et al. [16]. 
 
W1: A clean wound is an uninfected operative wound in which no inflammation is 
encountered and the respiratory, alimentary, genital or uninfected urinary tracts are 
not entered. In addition, clean wounds are primarily closed and, if necessary, drained 
with closed drainage. Operative incisional wounds that follow non-penetrating trauma 
should be included in this category. 
 
W2: Clean-contaminated wounds are operative wounds in which the respiratory, 
alimentary, genital or uninfected urinary tracts are entered under controlled 
conditions and without unusual contamination. Specifically operations involving the 
biliary tract, appendix, vagina and oropharynx are included in this category provided 
no evidence of infection or major break in technique is encountered. 
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W3: Contaminated wounds include open, fresh, accidental wounds. In addition 
operations with major breaks in sterile technique or gross spillage from the 
gastrointestinal tract, and incisions in which acute,nonpurulent inflammation is 
encountered are included in this category. 
 
W4: Dirty or infected wounds include old traumatic wounds with retained devitalised 
tissue and those that involve existing clinical infection or perforated viscera. This 
definition suggests that the organisms causing postoperative infection were present 
in the operative field before the operation. 
 
2.2.8. The ASA score[8]. 
The American Society of Anesthesiology developed a universal score for physical 
status classification at operation time. This five-level score looks as follows: 
A1 = Normally healthy patient 
A2 = Patient with mild systemic disease 
A3 = Patient with severe systemic disease that is not incapacitating 
A4 = Patient with an incapacitating systemic disease that is a constant threat to life 
A5 = Moribund patient who is not expected to survive for 24h with or without op. 
 
2.2.9. Duration of operation 
The HAISSI protocol [8] established 75th percentile cut-off values for the procedures, 
that would be included in SSI surveillance surveys. These values enable the 
observer to establish whether or not a type of surgery was performed within an 
average time-frame within a hospital or country (on average).  
The duration of a reintervention, that happened up to 72h after the primary 
procedure, was added to the duration of the primary procedure. 
 
• CABG: 5h 
• COLO: 3h 
• CSEC:  1h 
• CHOL: 2h 
• HPRO: 2h 
• KPRO: 2h 
• LAM:   2h 
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2.2.10. Basic SSI risk index 
This index is used by the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) in order to 
categorize surgical patients based on the presence of certain risk factors. The index 
score is determined by the (previously mentioned) wound contamination class, the 
ASA score and the duration of operation score. The presence of a risk factor 
(calculation see below) scores „1“ for each on the index score and the total score 
represents the patient’s risk category at the time of operation. 
 
Table1. Basic SSI risk index 
Category Score= 0 Score=1 
Wound contamination class W1 or 
W2 
W3 or W4 
ASA score A1 or A2 A3, A4 or 
A5 
Duration of operation score <T >T 
Basic SSI risk index= sum of scores (0-3) 
  
 
2.2.11. The McGeer criteria 
Last updated in 2012[17], these criteria have been a long standing data-gathering 
tool[18] for HCAIs in LTCFs. For the sake of brevity, it remains to be said that these 
are clinical criteria for establishing whether or not a resident of a LTCF has an active 
HCAI or is treated for one with the onset of symptoms occuring 48 hours after 
admission to the LTCF (and under exclusion of SSIs). This will lead to either 
„probable“ or ( by microbiological testing) „confirmed“  HCAIS, as laboratory testing in 
LTCFs is very limited and varies widely within Europe. These criteria are applicable 
for RTIs, UTIs, GITIs, BSIs, Skin infections, as well as eye, ear, nose and mouth 
infections. 
 
2.2.12. Hospital 
Concerning HCAI, it is important to differentiate the different types or levels of 
hospitals in order to gain insight into the kinds of medical services that are provided 
in these institutions (and which are not). This will aid in getting a clearer picture of the 
specific types of infections that are to be expected at a certain level.   
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There are four defined levels of hospitals and they were defined[7] as follows: 
 
Primary level: A general hospital with few specialties (mainly internal medicine, 
obstetrics-gynecology, pediatrics, general surgery) and limited laboratory services 
and without teaching function (e.g. a District hospital). 
 
Secondary level: A general hospital with five to ten specialties and teaching function, 
that also takes referrals from primary level hospitals (e.g. a Provincial hospital). 
 
Tertiary level: A hospital with multiple specialties, highly specialized staff and 
equipment and specialized imaging modalities. It’s clinical services are highly 
differentiated by function and it provides regional services including taking regular 
referrals from primary and secondary level hospitals (e.g. a central or University 
hospital). 
 
Specialized hospital: A hospital focused on a single specialty (with or without sub-
specialties) with highly specialized staff and equipment.  
 
2.2.13. Intensive care unit (ICU) 
The European Society of Intensive Care Medicine established the definition of an 
ICU in Europe in 2001: 
 
 “An ICU is a geographically defined area in the hospital providing care for critically ill 
patients with specialized personnel and complex equipment. It is staffed with a 
specific group of specially trained doctors, nurses and other allied personnel (e.g. 
physiotherapists, technicians) in appropriate numbers. Furthermore the ICU should 
provide at least facilities for temporary cardiac pacing and invasive hemodynamic 
monitoring, ventilation supports and pump-controlled administration of infusions. 
Facilities for blood gas, haemoglobin and electrolyte measurements should be 
provided in the ICU or in the immediate vicinity. An ICU should function 24 hrs a day, 
7 days a week. There must be at least one doctor immediately available at all times 
who can deal with all emergencies.“ [7] 
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2.2.14. Long-term care facilities (LTCF) 
As a relatively recent addition to the ECDC HCAI surveillance program, LCTF have a 
broader definition [9] and this has to be kept in mind while reviewing their data 
(because their might be significant differences between these institutions both within 
a country and the EU as a whole). Nevertheless, for data acquisition purposes, a 
LTCF was defined/ limited to the following: 
“Nursing homes, residential homes and mixed facilities, that are not hospital long-
term care wards, residential care (hotel/without any kind of nursing care), sheltered 
care 
houses, day centres, home-based centres, protected living.“ [9] 
 
2.3. Prevalence of Healthcare associated infections 
The following part concerns itself with the prevalence data collected within the last 8 
years by the ECDC and it’s institutions.These data-sets were collected, analysed and 
published at different times and cover a varying number of EU and EEA countries. 
Furthermore, the methodologies used to acquire these data-sets varied amongst 
participating countries and hospitals [10,11].  
Therefore, the author suggests that the presented data-sets should be viewed as 
crude indicators for the prevalence of the most common types of HCAIs during this 
decade in the observed sectors of the participating european countries . 
 
2.3.1. Overall prevalence   
The WHO estimates a 7,6% pooled prevalence, referring to an older ECDC report, 
that included only data from acute care hospitals[110,111]. The most recent number 
referring to the frequency/distribution of HCAI in Europe is given by the ECDC as an 
estimate of 
 4 131 000 affected patients per year. 
 
Because summarized data of the overall prevalence of HCAIs in all sectors of 
healthcare are missing (aka not produced by the ECDC or WHO) the author abstains 
from a further prevalence analysis at this point. The European prevalences for each 
sector are given in the appropriate chapters. 
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2.3.2. Countries 
As aforementioned, there are some variations as to which countries were included in 
the individual reports. Because of that, prevalence data presented in this review will 
feature up to 33 countries, namely: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, England, Nothern Ireland, Scotland, Wales. 
 
In some cases however, this review will focus on those countries1 that were 
represented in all 4 sources [10,11,12,13] in order to provide a more representative 
picture about the overall status of HCAIs and allow for a direct comparison between 
SSIs, ICU-HCAI and LTCF-HCAI in these countries. 
 
The HCAI prevalence by country varied between 2,3- 10,8%. The highest being in 
Portugal (10,8%), followed by Norway(7,8%), Finland and Netherlands(both 7,4%), 
Italy(6,3%), UK-England(6,0%), Germany(5,0%), UK-Scotland (4,7%), Czech 
Republic(4,6%), Hungary(4,5%), Malta(4,4%), UK-Nothern Ireland (4,2%) and Wales 
(4,1%). 
 
The relative frequency of microorganisms by country shows that E.coli is most 
frequent in France (26,6%), S.aureus in Malta (26,5%), Enterococcus in Sweden 
(27,6%), Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Klebsiella in Greece (16,8% and 17,6% 
respectively). 
 
2.3.3. Hospitals 
A European PPS from 2012 [12] analyzed data from 33 countries (see 2.3.2.) 
featuring 231 459 patients and found a mean HCAI prevalence of 6,0% (with a 95% 
confidence interval between 5,7- 6,3%) amounting to 13 829 patient with at least one 
recognized HCAI.  Most of which (92,3%) had one, 7% had two and 0,7% had three 
or more HCAIs.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  applies	  to:	  Czech	  Republic,	  Germany,	  Finland,	  Hungary,	  Italy,	  Malta,	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Portugal	  and	  United	  Kingdom	  (being	  either	  seperated	  into	  3-­‐4	  states	  england/NI/Wales/Scotland	  or	  unified	  as	  UK)	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According to the reviewed data [12 ]the HCAI prevalence was the highest in tertiary 
hospitals (7,4%), followed by specialized hospitals (6,0%) and both primary and 
secondary hospitals with 5% each. 
Though it has to be noted, that these percentages had a wide confidence interval, 
that even included 0% and (maybe therefore?) the interquartile range was used and 
it provides a more robust measurement. 
 
HCAI prevalence was highest in ICU patients (19,5%). In the other specialties 
(Internal medicine, surgery, paediatrics, ObGyn, geriatrics, psychiatry,rehabilitation 
medicine and others) the average prevalence was about 5,2%. Psychiatry had the 
lowest prevalence with less then 2%.  
 
The four most common types among the observed HCAIs were Pneumonia (23,5%), 
SSIs(19,6%), UTIs (19%), BSIs(10,7%). 
 
The most common HCAI types varied greatly, dependent on the patient/consultant 
specialty. 
Pneumonia/LRTI and BSIs were most common in the ICU setting, while SSIs 
appeared most commonly in surgery and gynaecology. UTIs were (more or less) 
equally common in rehabilitation, psychiatry and geriatrics. GI-infections were overall 
less frequent, but appeared to be most common in geriatrics[12]. 
 
The six most commonly reported microorganisms (by relative frequency) were 
E.coli(15.9%), S. aureus(12,3%), Enterococcus spp.(9,6%), Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa(8,9%), Klebsiela spp. (8,7%) and C.difficile (5,4%) all together accounting 
for over half of the HCAIs observed. 
 
2.3.4. Surgical Site infections 
In general, the commulative incidence for SSIs was found to be between 0,8% and 
9,6% in Europe [13] 
The, by far, highest incidence for SSIs appears to be after colon surgery 
(subcategorized into open and endoscopic surgery) followed by caesarean sections 
and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft(CABG) surgery.  
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Obviously, these types of surgeries are very diffrent from one another in more than 
just one way, rendering a superficial observation of the data lacking.  
 
What follows is a more in-depth look at the patient profile(sex and median age), as 
well as the surgery profile (median duration of surgery, percentage of contaminated 
operations, antibiotic prophylaxis, case-fatality and the percentage of urgent 
surgeries) in order to highlight the statistically observable differences between the 
surgeries and the countries they were performed in.  
 
2.3.4.1. Colon surgery 
The European surveillance system collected the data of over 50.000 colon surgeries 
within the years 2010 and 2011 [13] and found a cummulative incidence of SSI within 
30 days of surgery of 9,5%. The CI of SSIs was higher (10,6%) for open aka non-
endoscopic, then for endoscopic surgeries (7,1%). The most common type of SSI 
was of the superficial incisional  (50%), while 30% were deep incisional and 23% 
were of the organ/space type.  
About half of all recognized SSIs yielded positive microbiological results, that showed 
that most SSIs in colon surgeries are caused by a single microorganism (37,9%).  
 
The most common types of microorganism being identified were Enterobacteriaceae 
(47,3%) like E.coli (29,0%) and Klebsiella (4,5%), followed by Gram-positive cocci 
(30,0%) like Enterococcus spp. (19,6%).  Gram-negative non-fermenting 
bacteria(pseudomonas) make up 8,3% and anaerboes (Bacterioides) 7,4%.   
 
Of note, most (80%) SSIs in this categroy were diagnosed while the patient was in 
hospital care, compared to 20% that were detected after discharge. 
The patient profile was homogenous in terms of age (63-68) and sex.  
The surgery profile showed a lower case-fatality , lower percentage of contaminated 
operations and shorter post-operative stay period with a higher percentage of 
antibiotic prophylaxis for endoscopic surgeries then for open surgeries.  
 
While the median duration of both types of surgeries is relatively equal (163 vs 149 
min.), non-endoscopic surgeries had a significantly higher percentage of urgent 
operations (18,5%- almost 12 percent points higher!). 
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When looking at the highest CIs of SSIs in  open and closed colon surgeries in 
Europe, it appears, that Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain have the highest 
CIs values in both types of procedures (with endoscopic being generally lower). But 
there are some significant differences, when looking at the number of post-operative 
patient days, which were disproportionally high in Spain and Netherlands for 
endoscopic procedures. This is reflected in an above average(average is 5,3)  
incidence density (SSI per 1000 post-operative days) for the Netherlands(6,7), but in 
an ID more then twice the average for Spain (11,2).  
For open procedures Spain presented with the highest ID (13,0)- on an average of 
6,4- but without any irregularity in post-operative patient days. 
The distribtution of SSI types in Spain is relatively homogenous, while superficial 
incisional SSIs are the most common type in most other countries. 
On the other side, Germany has the lowest CI of SSI for endoscopic procedures with 
5,0%, while France has the lowest for open procedure (7,4%). 
 
With the highest CI of SSIs both in terms of European average and surgical 
procedure, colon surgery presents one of the biggest problems in terms of HCAI and 
SSI alike.  
The statistics suggest a major benefit of endoscopic over open procedures. 
Furthermore, the numbers suggest that SSIs in colon surgeries have an onset during 
the first two weeks post operatively(as 80% of SSIs are diagnosed in hospital and the 
median length of post-operative stay is 10-14 days ). Germany and France are the 
countries with the lowest CI and a more detailed look into their clinical guidelines and 
infrastructure could provide valuable insight for preventative measures. 
 
2.3.4.2. Caesarian section 
Data of over 160 000 Caesarian sections (C-sections) were collected [13] and 
showed a CI of 2,9% and an ID of 0,8/1000 post-operative days for SSIs in this 
category. The most common type was superficial (87%), while 10% were deep-
incisional and only 3% were organ/space related. This distribution is relatively 
consistent amongst all observed European countries. Only 8% of SSIs in this 
category showed a positive microbiological test. This should be kept in mind when 
further analysing  the nature of the infective organisms.  
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Most(63,8%) SSIs were caused by a single organism with Gram-positive cocci 
(53,6%) being the most common. Among these, S. aureus was the most common 
(25,1%) out of which almost a quarter were identified as MRSA.  Enterobacteriaceae 
(29,2%) like E.coli (17,8%) were the second largest group. Gram-negative non-
fermenting bacteria, anaerboes and others formed a relatively homogenous rest. 
84% of SSIs in this categroy were detected after discharge. 
The patient profile shows women with a median age of 31. 
The surgery profile shows that about half of the C-sections are urgent, 3% show 
some form of contamination and have a median duration of 40minutes, with patients 
staying for 5-6 days post-operatively. Antibiotic prophylaxis is given in almost 90% of 
cases and the post-operative case fatality is 0%.  
 
Norway and the United Kingdom have the highest CI of C-section related SSIs with 
6,8% and 6,7% respectively. On the other side Lithuania and Germany have the 
lowest with 0,4% and 0,7% respectively. The European average CI is 3,0%. 
 
While there is no identifiable case fatality due to SSIs in C-sections, there is a need 
to collect more reliable microbiological data. Interestingly, the absolute majority of 
cases are diagnosed after discharge (discharge date on average one week post-op.). 
Insight into the antibiotic regimen prescribed and the microflora present in the SSI 
could provide a basis for a more empirical approach in the matter. Furthermore, the 
length of the post-operative hospitalization period seems to be a worthy area of 
investigation for prevention. 
 
2.3.4.3. CABG surgery 
The data of over 40 000 CABG surgeries performed in Europe[13] showed a CI of 
3,5% and an ID of 1,9/1000 post-operative days for SSIs. The most common type 
was superficial (51%), followed by deep-incisional (34%) and organ/space 
related(15%) SSIs. There is a high variety between countries. While the shown 
distribution applies clearly to Malta, Italy, Norway and the UK, Spain seems to have a 
more homogenous distribution and Lithuania seems to have a higher proportion of 
deep-incisional SSIs. 
About half of all recognized SSIs yielded positive microbiological results, that showed 
that 66,5%of SSIs in CABG surgeries are cause by a single organism.  
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Gram-positive cocci (60,0%) presented as the most common. Among these, 
Coagulase-negatvie Staphylococci (30%) and S. aureus (21,6%) were the most 
common.  Enterobacteriaceae (22%) like E.coli (5,4%) were the second largest 
group, followed by mostly Gram-negative non-fermenting bacteria (6,3%). Most SSIs 
(62%) were diagnosed in hospitals. The patient profile shows a strong prediliction for 
males (3,7:1) with a median age of 68. 
The surgery profile shows that only 5,8% are urgent CABG procedures, very few 
(0,2%) show some form of contamination and have a median duration of over 200 
minutes, with patients staying for  about 11 days post-operatively. Antibiotic 
prophylaxis is given in 98,1% of cases and the post-operative case fatality is 2%.  
 
Malta(7,1%), Italy(6,1%) and Norway(5,7%) had the highest CI of SSI, while 
Germany and France had the lowest with 3,0% and 2,8% respectively. The European 
average CI is 3,5%. 
 
With almost 100% antibiotic prophylaxis, it comes somewhat unexpected, that the CI 
in CABG surgery is as high as it is. Especially if one considers the low rate of urgent 
operations and levels of contamination reported. Furthermore, the microflora present 
consists commonly of entereboacteriaceae. An insight into the antibiotic regimen 
used could provide valueable information about weather or not enterobacteriaceae 
were considered.  
 
2.3.5. Intensive care units 
The annual  epidemiological report of 2014 [11] looked at the data of over 1200 ICUs 
in Europe. In this report, patients were included if they were stationed in the ICU for 
more then 2 days. According to the definition given in 2.2.1-2.2.4, the HCAIs in this 
sector are subcategorized into ICU-PN, ICU-BSI and ICU- UTI. 
Overall, 5,3% of ICU patients acquired pneumonia of which over 90% were 
associated with intubation. The mean incidence density per ICU was 6,4 pneumonia 
episodes/1000 patient days.  
The most common recognized microorganisms were Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
(16,6%) with 26,6% of isolates showing ceftazdime resistance and S.aureus (14,6%) 
out of which  46,1% were identified as MRSA.  
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Other very common organisms were Klebsiella and E.coli (each about 10%) with 
26,3% of the letter showing resistance to third-generation cephalosporins. Romania, 
Portugal and Lithuania had significantly higher rates of Acinetobacter spp. then all 
other countries (26,2%, 14,1% and 18,7% repectively). Austria presented with a high 
percentage of Candia spp. 
Of all the countries included in the analysis[11], France had the highest median rate 
of intubation-associated pneumonia (IAPN), while Lithuania had the lowest.  
However, comparing countries based on these data should be discouraged, as the 
sample sizes for ICUs and number of patients vary significantly. This produces 
statistical outliers in the IAPN-rate, that seem to coincide with the observed (skewed) 
sampling. 
 
About 3% of ICU patients acquired a BSI [11] of which 43% were catheter-related, 
36,2% secondary to another infection (mostly pulmonary, GI or UTI) and 20,5% of 
unkown origin. The average CVC utilisation rate was 74,4 days per  1000 patient 
days. 
The most frequently found organisms were coagulase-negative staphylococci 
(22,3%), Enterococcus(12,5%) and S.aureus (10,1%). This distribution is more or 
less similar in most countries observed. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Luxenbourg presented with a high percentage of Candia spp. . 
 
About 3% of ICU patients acquired an UTI of which over 95% were associated with 
the use of a urinary catheter(used in 83,9% of patient-days).  
The most common species were E.coli, Candida spp. and Enterococci spp. but 
Klebsiella spp. were also common in Belgium, Romania and Slovenia. 
 
The overall prevalence of HCAI in ICUs in Europe seems to be somewhere between 
11,7% [11] and 19,5%[12] depending on the number of HCAI-types included (and 
based on the fact, that the cited PPSs werde conducted some years appart). In any 
case, the  prevalence is higher then for all other specialties combined.   
 
2.3.6. Long-Term care facilities  
According to the definition given in 2.2.14 the ECDC surveillance report [10] has 
collected data from over 1000 LTCF in Europe. 
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It found a 3,4% crude HCAI prevalence. The highest prevalences were reported for 
Portugal (9,5%), UK (6,8%) and Netherlands (5,8%). Most common were 
RTIs(31,2%), UTIs (31,2%) and skin infections (22,8%). 
The most frequently reported microorganisms were Escherichia coli (34.4%), 
Staphylococcus aureus (10.2%) and Proteus mirabilis (8.1%). 
The infection control structure and process indicators showed an overall increase in 
the percentage of LTCF having infection control committees (29,1% to 42,6%) and 
protocols for managing multidrug-resistant microorganisms. 95,9% reported having a 
written hand hygiene protocol, but only 50% had protocols for the management of 
venous lines. The median percentage of single rooms was 57,5%. The average 
alcohol hand-rub was 4,5L/ 1000 resident-days and 56,2% reported using alcohol-
based handrubs frequently. 
Because of significant variations in (rather small) sample sizes, the author abstains 
from a further prevalence analysis at this point. 
 
3. Prevention of Healthcare-associated infections 
The word “prevention” comes from the Latin “Praevenire”, which means “to come 
before”. In colloquial terms, this is akin to “acting before an event takes place in order 
to avoid the event from taking place”. But in order to so, one must be aware of the 
event to come, knowing it’s nature and knowing what to do. When talking about HCAI 
prevention, it’s the overarching institution of the ECDC (as its full name suggests), 
which is responsible to gather as much information as possible, about the 
circumstances surrounding the issue, in order to act and decrease the rates of 
HCAIs.  
Therefore, the ECDC has called for [19] the creation of a prevention programme 
called „the Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare-Associated Infections“ (ARHAI) 
programme [20]. It is conducted by three networks, that are all part of the ECDC: 
HAI-Net, ESAC-Net, EARS-Net. 
ESAC-Net is responsible for the surveillance of antimicrobial consumption while 
EARS-Net covers the area of surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in Europe. 
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HAI-Net itself primarily deals with the surveillance of HCAIs in terms of SSIs, ICU- & 
LTCF-associated infections and HCAIs in acute care hospitals and conducts point 
prevalence surveys for each of them. Additionally it is in the process of supporting 
capacity building for surveillance of Clostidium difficile infections, following an 
outbreak of a new hypervirulent strain (PCR ribotype 027). Furthermore, it provides 
infection control structure and process indicators (SPI) for the evaluation of control 
and prevention programmes2, as well as basic infection control training programmes. 
Lastly it manages EPIS (see below). 
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of ARHAI 
 
This „triumvirate“ under ARHAI has six major goals, that can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. To improve the modus operandi and communications between EARS-Net, 
ESAC-Net and HAI-net. 
2. To manage the web-based plattform Epidemic Intelligence Information System 
(EPIS), with the EPIS AMR-HAI module, that enables its members to rapidly 
exchange informations about resistances and newly emerging pathogens. 
3. To provide guidelines and systematic reviews.  
4. To contribute to training on surveillance, prevention and control of AMR and 
HAI. 
5. To support member states in AMR and HCAI-associated activities. 
6. To coordinate the European Antibiotic Awareness Day on 18 November. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  SPIs	  were:	  “…alcohol-­‐based	  hand	  rub	  consumption	  as	  a	  proxy	  indicator	  of	  hand	  hygiene,	  the	  percentage	  of	  single-­‐room	  beds	  as	  a	  proxy	  indicator	  for	  isolation	  capacity	  of	  patients	  carrying	  microorganisms	  requiring	  enhanced	  infection	  prevention	  and	  control	  measures,	  and	  full-­‐time	  equivalents	  of	  specialised	  infection	  prevention	  and	  control	  staff.“	  [12]	  	  
HAI-­‐Net	  
ESAC-­‐Net	  EARS-­‐Net	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It becomes apparent from its field of responsibilities, that HAI-Net is the institution of 
interest for this review. It collects, analyzes and presents surveillance data on a 
European scale and strives for a streamlined and unified European approach to 
combat HCAIS.  
 
When talking about prevention in a more practical sense, it refers to a continous 
multidisciplinary approach of surveillance (as both the first and the last step), 
followed by staff education, limiting transmissions, prudent use of antimicrobials and 
evaluation of the impact that surveillance has made.  
 
 
Figure 2. The cycle of HCAI prevention 
 
While HAI-Net does (part of) this on a European level, there are national and 
hospital-specific institutions, that act on its behalf and stand in continous 
communication with them. The following chapters will highlight these institutions, their 
guidelines and objectives. 
 
3.1. Healthcare associated infections surveillance 
Surveillance systems enable healthcare institutions to investigate problem areas and 
are an effective tool for decreasing HCAI rates [24,25,26]. The goals of such a 
system are: 
• Educating staff members (incl. the administration) about ARM & HCAIs, as 
well as safe-practice guidelines 
• Monitor trends in infection rates and identify risk factors 
• Evaluate staff member’s performance and the efficacy of the system itself. 
 
Surveillance	  of	  HCAI	  &	  ARM	  
Staff	  &	  Patient	  education	  
Limiting	  	  transmissions	  Prudent	  use	  of	  antibiotics	  
Evaluation	  of	  	  the	  impact	  via	  quality	  indicatiors	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In order for such a system to work well in practice, it has to be simple, efficient and 
follow clearly defined guidelines in order to be implemented as part of the normal 
working practice without alienating healthcare workers and reduce their compliance 
with the system. 
There is also the need for clear case-definitions, which provide an adequate level of 
sensitivity and specificity with the right in- and exclusion criteria and standardized 
methodology.  
Lastly, the system has to have a consistent timeline with clear deadlines for data 
inclusion [21]. Whether or not a system forefills these criteria can be seen on the 
quality of data harvested (considering all other confounders have been excluded) 
over time. It is crucial, that staff on every level of healthcare is included and that 
proper training is ensured. A seemingly good system might fail, because a significant 
part of the staff does not comply with the guidelines. The success of a system is 
measured by its impact (i.e. change in infection rates after a full cycle) and in the 
end, the products of continous surveillance are defined prevention-objectives for the 
next cycle (semester, year, decade). The ultimate goal of surveillance is to improve 
quality of care and reduce the costs associated with HCAIs[21]. 
 
3.1.1. European Surveillance 
As mentioned above, ECDC’s HAI-Net is responsible for European surveillance. It 
includes 31 member states (incl. Croatia, Norway and Iceland) [12], which 
communicate over the EPIS plattform. The network collects data from its member 
states via TESSy to provide up-to-date data in the form of digital interactive 
databases, guidelines, protocols and PPS (see 1.5.) and relays information and 
contacts about training programmes [27], all (TESSy itself is, of course, anonymous 
and password-protected) of which is publicly available on their website. Interestingly, 
it provides SPIs [11,12,20] in order to enable EU wide quality of care 
comparisons(see 3.4.). 
As part of ARHAI, it helps coordinating the European Antibiotic Awareness Day.  
 
 
 
 
 
    	  
	  	   27	  
3.1.2. National Surveillance  
Country specific programmes provide a forum for exchanging national HCAI & AMR 
data, reinforce surveillance and guidelines for HCAI prevention,  facilitate access to 
hygiene and safety resources, set national objectives as well assess the 
effectiveness of interventions[21]. 
These programmes are initiated by the national health authorities, which themselves 
might delegate an agency to oversee the programme. 
 
Two examples of such an angencies would be the „German National Reference 
Center for Surveillance of Nosocomial Infection“ (Ger. Nationales Referenzzentrum 
für Surveillance von nosokomialen Infektionen)[22] under the authority of the Robert 
Koch Institute and the Czech National Reference Center for HAI under the authority 
of the National Insitute of Public Health [23]. 
 
3.1.3. Hospital Surveillance 
A well working surveillance system at the hospital level is crucial. It is the basic input 
and output level of HCAI surveillance and should therefore have its focus on 
acquiring „proper“ data. This means setting clear objectives and deadlines for data 
gathering, but also communicating the (standardized) methodology that is to be used 
[21]. There should be a focus on an infection control team (ICT), which consists of 
infection control nurses (ICN), infection control doctors (ICD) and a director of 
infection control (DIPC) which meet on a regular schedule and present the prime 
authorities on local HCAI surveillance (and prevention) programmes. The members 
of the ICT identify potential hazards, arrange isolation of infected patients, conduct 
regular audits, facilitate collaboration between the different wards, inform and teach 
staff about infection control, safe use etc. [28].  
At the top of the system should be an infection control committe (ICC), that consists 
of members of the ICT, further staff from all wards and the chairman (which may or 
may not bet he DIPC, the ICD or a senior ICN). The ICC should meet on a regular 
basis to discusses  hospital reports on current HCAI problems, evaluate and modify 
policies for infection control, enable inter-departmental communication, identify risk 
factors and make decisions about further proceedings in that matter[28].  
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3.2. Patient-safety: Education & Training of healthcare professionals 
While education guidelines and recommendations are present on all levels of the 
healthcare system, hospitals have direct control over educating infection control 
professionals. 
As an essential part of a HCAI prevention programme, education of hosptial staff is 
conducted by the ICT under suprervision of the ICC. While the ICC concerns itself 
with the quality and actuality of the education programme, the ICT produces an 
infection control manual and implements staff training. This training encompases 
medical-, surgical-, housekeeping-, maintenance-, nursing-, kitchen-, sterilization-, 
and laundry service staff, laboratory workers (incl. microbiologists) and hospital 
pharmacists. 
 
And while each has their specific field of action and respsonsibilities, it is the ICT, 
that carries the main responsibility and has to continuosly maintain the highest 
achievable quality of care. 
Because of the crucial importance of the ICT, the ECDC has defined Europe-wide 
core competencies for ICT members, that are going to be used as an assesment tool 
in the future[29]. 
 
3.2.1 Core competencies for infection control and hospital hygiene 
professionals 
The ECDC defines core competencies as: „...the minimum-prerequisite, common to 
all professionals in this field...(for) the proven ability to use knowledge, skills and 
personal, social and/or methodological abilities, in work or study situations and in 
professional and personal development.“ [29]. 
These core competencies are divided into 4 areas, 16 domains and 2 levels. 
The two levels of core competencies are as follows: The introductory level for junior 
specialists and the expert level for a senior specialist. A newly appointed member of 
the ICT or hospital hygiene staff with little or no practical experience in the field is 
considered a „junior“, while experienced professionals that are able to assess, 
develop and implement new solutions are considered „seniors“. 
As such, the roles of a junior are defined through contribution, communication and 
participation, while the roles of a senior emphasize leadership, management, 
organisation, priority identification, reviewing & assessment [29]. 
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Table 2. Areas and domains of competency in infection control and hospital hygiene  
(Source: ECDC. Core competencies for infection control and hospital hygiene professionals in the European Union. Stockholm: 
ECDC; 2013.) 
Area  Domain 
Elaborating and advocating an infection control 
programme 
Area 1. Programme management 
Management of an infection control programme, 
work plan and projects 
Contributing to quality management 
Contributing to risk management 
Performing audits of professional practices and 
evaluating performance 
Infection control training of employees 
Area 2. Quality improvement 
Contributing to research 
Designing a surveillance system 
Managing (implementation, follow up, evaluation) a 
surveillance system 
Area 3. Surveillance and 
investigation of healthcare-
associated infections (HAIs) 
Identifying, investigating and managing outbreaks 
Elaborating infection control interventions 
Implementing infection control healthcare 
procedures 
 
Contributing to reducing antimicrobial resistance 
 
Advising appropriate laboratory testing and use of 
laboratory data 
 
Decontamination and sterilisation of medical 
devices 
 
Area 4. Infection control activities 
Controlling environmental sources of infections 
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3.2.2. Availability of infection control professionals  
While the core competencies are a reference for a European quality standard and 
exist to harmonize infection prevention across European member states, there are 
significant differences in availability and quality of ICTs, as well as training 
programmes [12,30]. 
In 2011 and 2012, the European median number of ICN per hospital beds was 1/250, 
which is in line with the standard [12,31]. The median number of ICD per hospital 
beds was 0,36/250. Because of the heterogneous nature of the specialisations of 
ICDs, there is no standard available [12]. 
13,6% of the reported EU/EEA hospitals having no ICN and 26,6% having no ICD at 
all. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia reported having neither. 
Overall, the hospital type with the highest median number of ICNs and ICDs  was the 
specialized hospital with (with 1,57 and 0,6 respectively). 
While hospital size had a significant inverse correlation to the median number of 
ICN/250 hospital beds, it did not significantly influence the distribution of ICDs [12]. 
 
3.3. Preventing transmission of HCAIs 
As third part of HCAI prevention, limiting transmission rates directly and personally 
affects all hospital staff and the entire hospital environment. Because 
microorganisms adapted various techniques of survival (AMR, encapsulation, 
sporulation, biofilms etc.) and can therefore survive in different environments, it is 
important to know how to avoid being contaminated, contaminating others or the 
environment and to know how to create and maintain a level of hygiene, that limits 
HCAI transmission. But while the acquisition of such knowledge is part of the core 
competencies and other education programmes, the following chapters will review 
evidence-based practices, that all staff (but especially healthcare workers) should 
adhere to. 
 
3.3.1 Preventing Person-to-Person transmission  
Cross-contamination of patients via healthcare workers (HCW) is a known 
phenomenon [32,33,35,37,36]  and has been frequently linked to a long series of 
factors [35,38,39]. The most common factors include personal hygiene, especially 
hand hygiene as well as desinfectants and hand washing technique used. 
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Commonly held believes about „clean“ activities in patient care, were proven to be 
everything but „clean“ [40,41,42]. Pathogens can be present on any patients skin, 
even when the patient „appears to be clean“ [43,44,45,46,47,48]. 
The situation becomes worse, should a patient or HCW suffer from a dermatological 
condition (e.g. chronic dermatitis) or an immunosuppressed state (e.g. in diabetes) 
[32,61,62,63,64]. 
Additionally, the duration of patient-care activities has a high positive association with 
the likelihood and degree of contamination of the HCW involved [49,50].  
 
Person-to-person transmission of HCAIS has been summarized to five essential 
steps [34]: 
1. The pathogen resides on the patient’s skin or in the environment  
2. The pathogen is transferred to the HCW’s hands (direct contact or aerosol) 
3. The pathogen survives on the HCW’s hands and colonizes them 
4. Inadequate hand-hygiene enables the pathogen to survive 
5. The pathogen is transferred from the HCW’s hands to another patient or the 
environment 
 
It cannot be stressed enough, that it is crucial (not only as part of an education 
programme, but on a daily basis) to break commonly held belives about apparently 
„clean“ environments and educate HCWs, patients and other staff-members about 
the nature of cross-contamination and the (central)role they (and their behaviors) 
play in it. 
Lastly, the hospital administration has to be aware, that understaffing significantly 
increases the infection risk for patients [51,52,53] and that increasing the nursing 
staff to a ratio of about 2 nurses per patient has the potential to prevent up to a 
quarter of HCAIs [53].  
 
3.3.2. Personal hygiene & clothing  
All hospital staff is required to adhere to a common standard, that is considered good 
personal hygiene and while definitions for what is considered „good“ may vary, there 
are certain factors in clothing and „styling“, that have to be considered universal. 
As such, a clean outfit should be worn every single day and the clothing should be 
made of material that is easy to decontaminate. 
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Furthermore, contaminated clothes should be changed as soon as possible after 
exposure [21]. This also means, that a clean „replacement outfit“ should be at hand. 
Obviously, wearing work uniforms (e.g. scrubs) is the easiest solution for this, but the 
availability of such uniforms depends on the financial situation of the healthcare 
institution. 
There has been debate about the significance of long-sleeved clothing (including 
white-coats) as potential carrier for pathogens and the risk associated with it. 
Nevertheless, the WHO [21,34] advises against wearing long-sleeved clothing.  
Hair should be worn short and facial hair (e.g. beard and mustache) must be trimmed 
[21]. 
Wearing jewlery (rings) and artificial nails has been linked to an increased rate of 
contamination and transmission of HCAIs [35,38,39]. Therefore, HCWs are not 
supposed to wear any of those (or similar) items during work [21,34]. 
 
3.3.3. Hand hygiene 
As mentioned before as step four of the five essential steps in person-to-person 
transmission, inadequate hand hygiene is maybe the most important and most 
preventable factor in transmission. Conversely, adequate hand hygiene has been 
proven to significantly decrease the risk of transmission [36,65,66]. Therefore, it is 
important for every HCW and staff member to know and comply with the guidelines 
for proper hand hygiene [57,58]. 
Whether it is because of lack of time [51,52], underestimation of the contamination 
risk [40,41,42,43,44] or non-compliance with recommended techniques [54,55,56], 
there are many factors that contribute to conditions that enable HCAI transmission. 
Amongst these, the first one to consider would be the choice of decontaminant.  
Comparing the relative efficacy of commonly-available decontaminants, like alcohol-
based solutions, antiseptic soaps (with or without triclosan or chlorhexidine) and plain 
soaps, it has been found that alcohol-based solutions are superior to both antiseptic- 
and plain soaps in most settings [34,65,67,68,69,80]. Hand-rubbing with an alcohol-
based solution turned out to be superior, especially, when compared to hand-
washing with antiseptic soap  [65]. 
In general, alcohol has been proven to be effective against HSV, HIV, RSV, HBV, 
HCV, influenza and vaccina virus [74,75,76].  
 
    	  
	  	   33	  
Additionally, alcohol-based solutions have a bactericidal effect against MRSA and 
VRE (but perform poorly against spores, protozoan oocysts and non-enveloped 
viruses)[67,68,69]. 
Alcohol as decontaminant works by denaturing the proteins of microorganisms[71] 
and as such, are germicidal. But alcohol doesn’t a have a residual activity and 
regrowth of colonies can occour over time [78,79], which presents a problem for 
(protracted)surgeries. Agents like chlorhexidine and triclosan do have residual 
activity, which could be considered for these cases. The efficacy of alcohol-based 
solutions has been linked to and is somewhat depenent on the availability, 
formulation and concentration of the solution and the degree of its usage. It has been 
found that the optimal concentration for alcohol-based solutions is somewhere 
between 60-80% [72,73]. 
The main types of alcohol-based solutions in the EU contain either ethanol, 
isopropanol or n-propanol. The EU standard for alcohol-based solutions is 60% 
isopropanol [70]. In any case, alcohol-based handrubs are considered the gold 
standard for hand hygiene and decontamination in prevention of HCAIs[34,80]. 
Secondly, the hand cleaning technique used would be another important factor. It 
has been implicated, that the process of handwashing itself might be more effacious 
then the bacteriostatic effect of medicated soaps [34,41]. In case of visibly dirty 
hands, it is recommended to first commence hand-washing, followed by hand-
rubbing with an alcohol-based solution[66]. The actual practical technique according 
to WHO consensus recommendation can be found in the WHO Guidelines for Hand 
Hygiene [34]. 
Furthermore, the hand drying technique is to be considered as well, as it has been 
shown, that wet hands increase the risk of contamination and spread of 
microorganism[34,65]. In general, the cleaning process is not complete until the 
hands are dry (even when combining multiple decontaminants[66]).  How the hands 
are dried (air-fan, papaer towel, sponatneous evaporation) has not been proven to 
show significant differences in outcome. 
 
But all things considered, non-adherence to the recommended hygiene procedures is 
a consistent (and persistant) problem and adherence has been reported with an 
average range of about 35-48% [54,55,56,57]. Major risk factors for non-adherence 
were professional category, hospital ward, time and intensity of patient care.  
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As such, being a doctor or a nursing assistant has been shown to be associated with 
reduced adherence [59,60]. Also, dealing with high intensity care patients (e.g ICU 
patients) significantly decreased adherence[58]. 
In summary, compliance with hand hygiene guidelines has been shown to be 
deficient and especially in situations, where the infection risk (and therefore the need 
to comply) is the highest. But the evidence available has shown that adherence can 
be improved by  better staffing[51,52], providing alcohol-based handrubs on the 
bedside [54,80] or using handrubs with added skin conditioners [78]. 
Since 2006, the WHO has worked on a hand hygiene improvement strategy, that 
includes a prevention rogramme called „My five moments for hand hygiene“. This 
programme follows the basic structure described in 3. and provides evidence-based 
information and education to HCWs. Its aim is to link specific hand hygiene actions to 
specific outcomes and increase a HCWs sense of agency and control. 
 
The key elements of the progamme are hand transmission and the concept of 
specific care regions (aka „patient zone“, „healthcare area“, „critical site“) [34]. The 
„five moments“ refer to the situations in which contamination or transmission is 
possible, namely:  
 
1. Before touching a patient (coming from a healthcare area to a patient zone) 
2. Before a clean/aseptic procedure (working on a critical site) 
3. After body fluid exposure risk (changing between patient zone and critical site) 
4. After touching a patient (coming from a patient zone) 
5. After touching patient surroundings (coming from a patient zone) 
 
The crucial point of the programme is to convey a picture in which a HCW can 
visualize themselves and the moments for hand hygiene. 
 
3.3.4. Preventing Environment-to-Person Transmission 
While the term „environment“ invites to analyze the entire infra- and superstructure of 
a hospital, this part of the review will focus on those parts of the infrastructure, that 
are „high risk“ contamination areas for HCAIS. Unsuprisingly, these are the areas 
where patients and HCWs come into contact most frequently. This includes patient 
rooms, surgical theaters(and perioperative care units) and intensive care units. 
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3.3.4.1. Patient rooms 
Usually, patient rooms are sparsly furnished and contain a bed, a bed-side table(with 
storage space), maybe a couple of chairs and a separate table for eating (if the 
patient is mobile). Additional furniture is possible, as is a television. Rooms can be 
single-patient bedrooms or can contain any number of beds. The number of single-
patient bedrooms is actually a risk indicator for HCAIS and a higher percentage of 
single-patient bedrooms is related to lower rates of HCAI prevalence [12]. 
 
To simplify, all areas that the patient comes into direct (or indirect- via objects like 
books, jewlery etc.) contact with become contaminated with the patient’s flora 
[42,81,82,83, 93,94,96,114] and the same applies to HCWs (and potential guests!). 
Even a “no-hands“ approach of HCWs towards patients doesn’t prevent 
contamination of the HCW’s hands [83,86,88].  
 
The flora of such contamination is most likely to consist of staphylococci, entercocci 
and clostridium difficile [34, 87,88,]. Cleaning of a patient room should be tailored to 
the likelihod of contamination. The WHO practical guide for the prevention of HCAIs 
[21] suggests classifying hospital areas into four levels (Zone A to D). A patient room 
of a non-infected patient would be classified as “Zone B“ and should be cleaned with 
a procedure that does not raise dust and uses detergents to improve the quality of 
cleaning. Only “visibly contaminated areas“ [21] are supposed to be disinfected. A 
patient room of a infected patient would be classifed as “Zone C“ and should be 
“cleaned with a disinfectant solution and room-specific cleaning equipment“[21]. “All 
horizontal surfaces (and toilet areas) in rooms classified “Zone B“ (or higher should 
be cleaned daily“ [21]. 
Completely preventing hand contamination from the environment of a patient room 
seems to be a difficult, if not impossible, endeavour and it comes down to appropriate 
cleaning, hand hygiene and clothing in order to minimize the risk. 
 
3.3.4.2. Operating rooms 
While the basic concept of “patient/HCW contact equals contamination“ is also true 
for ORs, there are certain factors that are different. 
First, all of the OR’s  horizontal surface should be cleaned at the beginning and the 
end of every working day and after every procedure. 
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Once per week, all surfaces (incl. annexes) should be cleaned. ORs are classified as 
“Zone D“ and should be “cleaned with a disinfectant solution and room-specific 
cleaning equipment“ [21].  Another consideration goes to sterile areas, such as 
drapes on patients or the sterile area of operating equipment. These areas should 
have as little contact as possible and drapes should not be moved until the procedure 
is over. Should a sterile area come into contact with a non-sterile area (e.g. a surgical 
gown is accidentaly touched by a scrub nurse), both areas are considered to be 
contaminated and have to be cleansed immediately. This can lead to participating 
HCWs having to undergo the entire surgical preparation procedure again. 
All HCWs participating in the operation must wear sterile surgical gowns, two sets of 
gloves and a mask. Personal hygiene (see 3.3.2.) is a must and so is state-of-the art 
surgical hand preparation [21,34]. The number of people in the OR should be 
minimized, as should unnecessary movement and conversation [21]. All this (and 
more) considered, cases of SSI transmission  have been reported despite wearing 
gloves [37,39]. 
 
And while sterile gloves do prevent contamination [89] to a degree [93] and double 
gloving decreases the risk of glove puncture to about 4%, punctured gloves are 
considered to double the risk of SSIs [91,92].  
Lastly, handwash stations have also been identified as a source of hand 
contamination in surgery [77,90]. 
 
3.3.4.3. Intensive care units 
As mentioned before, ICUs are entirely high risk areas for HCAIs. They have the 
highest HCAI prevalence (see 2.3.3.) and the ICU staff has very low compliance with 
meeting the necessary hand-hygiene standards (see 3.3.3.). The frequent use of 
invasive devices (see 3.3.5.) adds to the problem. ICUs are classified as “Zone D“ 
and should be “cleaned with a disinfectant solution and room-specific cleaning 
equipment, with all horizontal surfaces (and toilet areas) being cleaned daily“ [21]. 
Only care-essential equipment should be in the patient area and cleaned on a daily 
basis. Unused or not care-essential equipment should be stored away from any 
areas of patient contact.  
Cleaning personal must be aware of specific guidelines for ICU cleaning procedures 
[28,94]. 
    	  
	  	   37	  
In summary, prevention of HCAI transmission in the ICU is difficult and strict 
adherence to hygienic practices, as mentioned  before, is dismal. 
 
3.3.5. Preventing Equipment-to-Person Transmission 
Medical and surgical equipment has the most direct contact with the patient and their 
body fluids.Invasive devices are routinely used especially in the ICU and ORs . Most 
commonly, ventilators, vascular and urinary catheters are sources of infections (see 
2.2.5. and 2.3.5). 
The following chapters give a summarized overview of the problems and (possible) 
solutions for preventing transmission from such devices. 
 
3.3.5.1. Mechanical ventilators 
Patients on mechanical ventilation are more likely to acquire respiratory infections- 
the case of ventilator-acquired pneumonia(VAP). Weather the patient is in the ICU or 
undergoing surgery under general anesthesia, there are guidelines for the specific 
care of ventilated patients [28,95]. 
 
In summary, Oral, rather then nasal intubation is preferred and cuff-pressure should 
remain constant in order to both avoid tracheal damage and aspiration of gastric 
contents. Secretions should be drained, if possible under closed suction and HCWs 
should always wear protective clothing. Oral antiseptics should be part of the 
prophylaxis of VAP[96]. Because decreasing gastric acid secreation increases the 
risk of VAP, anti-acids and H2-blockers should not be used, but sucralfate may be an 
acceptible alternative. Generally, patients with impaired consciousness 
(physiological, pathological or iatrogenic) should be positioned to limit the potential 
for aspiration. Perioperative physiotherapy (e.g. breathing excercises) may prevent 
postoperative pneumonia, especially in patients with chronic respiratory disease [21]. 
Concerning the ventilator itself, individual ventilator circuit tubing should be used for 
every ICU patient (exchanged every 7 days for a given patient on ventilation), or after 
a ventilator has been used in an operation of an infected patient . Otherwise, 
ventilator circuit tubing should only be exchanged every 7 days (e.g. in OR use of 
general anesthesia). Nebulizers, heat and moisture exchangers, external tubing and 
filters should all be single-patient use only (with nebulizers being desinfected after 
each use) [21,28].  
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Routine screening for HCAIs in the environment or on patients provides no benefit 
[28]. 
 
3.3.5.2. Intravascular lines and catheters 
All hospital patients will require intravascular access-points at some point during their 
stay. 
As this harbours the risk of BSI, IV-lines and catheters should be used only if 
necessary and placed by an experienced HCW. Adequate equipment, technique and 
hygiene practices are a must [21,28,97]. In case of catheters, maximum sterile 
barrier precautions must be met. The patient’s skin at the insertion site must be 
cleaned with an antiseptic that has to be applied for an appropriate amount of time 
and be allowed to completely dry before insertion of the catheter [28,97]. Of note: 
while the aseptic technique must be used for placing and handling a catheter, it may 
(but does not have to) be used for peripheral vascular lines. After placement, a sterile 
gauze (if insertion site is oozing) or transparent semi-permeable dressing should be 
applied to the insertion site [97]. When accessing a catheter port, aseptic technique 
must be used [28]. 
The WHO recommends that “peripheral lines should not be left in situ beyond 72h“  
and “must be removed when  no longer required or if there is any evidence of 
infection (or phlebitis [21])“[28]. 
 
3.3.5.3. Urinary catheters 
Catheter-related UTIs are a common phenomenon in any hospital, ICU or LTCF and 
there has been a strong association between catheters and UTIs. Furthermore, there 
is a strong association with duration of placement and the prevalence of UTI  (see 
2.3.5.).  
These devices should only be used if necessary and be left in place for as short a 
time as possible [21,98]. Catheters have to be placed by an experienced clinician, 
under aseptic conditions and with the patient’s perineal area disinfected [21,28]. The 
smallest catheter that allows free urinary flow should be chosen in order to minimize 
damage to the urethral (and prostatic) mucosa [98]. Once the patient’s urethral 
meatus is cleaned and the right catheter is chosen, the catheter can be placed (as 
atraumatically as possible) with the help of a lubricant [21, 99].  
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Drainage will occur through a closed system that can only be broken if there is a 
clinical indication to do so. The drainage system should have a needleless port 
through which sampling can be undertaken under aseptic technique [28].  
 
3.3.5.4. Decontamination and Sterilization 
The method for cleaning medical equipment depends on the potential risk for 
transmission. This risk for transmission itself depends on the nature of patient 
contact. Invasive equipment has the highest risk of transmission, while equipment, 
that only comes into contact with intact skin (toilets, sinks etc.) has the lowest risk.  
For ventilators and associated equipment, see 3.3.5.1. . 
 
3.4 Antimicrobial use and consumption 
When talking about drug utilization, it is important to note that the terms „antimicrobial 
use“ and „antimicrobial consumption“ are not synonymous.  
The former was used in previous PPS[10,12] of HAI-Net, in which data about the 
direct application (aka usage) of antibiotics was gathered , while the latter was used 
in the ESAC surveillance report [108] and represents the number of DDD per 1000 
inhabitants per day (see 3.4.1.).  
  
3.4.1. The ATC/DDD system 
The system that is used in researching and monitoring drug utilization is called the 
Anatomical Therapeutical Chemical (ATC) classification system issued by the 
WHO[32].  
 
It features almost all registered drugs and classifies them according to five levels 
(anatomical main group, therapeutic subgroup, pharmacological subgroup, chemical 
subgroup and chemical substance) in order to yield an international code, that is 
uniformly understood. Furthermore, it provides a measure of use or consumption via 
the unit of defined daily dose (DDD). The DDD represents an average maintenance 
dose per day for a drug used for its main indication in adults. This unit (or the entire 
system for that matter) does not provide information about the (proper) therapeutic 
dose for the individual patient, nor does it indicate any sort of adequacy or efficacy of 
the given treatment[32].  
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In summary, the ATC/DDD system provides a tool, with which an observer can 
acquire a rough estimate of drug utilization across countries, regions or healthcare 
settings over time.  
As such, it is used in the first (and last) step of a prevention programme (see 3.1.) in 
order to improve antimicrobial usage and form guidelines. 
 
3.4.2. Guidelines for antimicrobial usage 
Guidelines for the use of antimicrobials are formulated by the ICC and represent a 
set of evidence-based recommendations for HCWs. They provide information about 
which agents are preferred, what dosage should be used and for how long patients 
should be treated for a given disease. Furthermore, they can provide information 
about cost-effective usage of drugs and the use in pregnancy, renal failure or 
pediatric patients, as well as provide treatment algorythms[103].  
 
At present, there are no uniform EU/EEA guidelines for the prescriptions of 
antimicrobials. While that does not mean that there aren’t national guidelines, they 
may vary significantly from country to country in terms of dosage, duration of 
treatment, etc. . 
 
Even though the European commission was aware of the need of EU-wide 
prescription guidelines and issued a recommendation for such  guidelines in 2002 
[105], the ECDC only called for an initiative to start a draft for “the prudent use of 
antimicrobials in human health“ [104] in May 2016.  
Such guidelines already exist for veterinary medicine [106] and are taken into 
account together with the EC recommendation [105], national prescription guidelines 
and the existing EU policy for antimicrobial resistance. A first draft is in the works 
[107] and is expected to be delivered in October 2016. 
 
3.4.3. Antimicrobial resistance 
The major problem with inappropriate use of antibiotics is the development of 
antimicrobial resistance(AMR). AMR is defined in two ways. Firstly, in reference to 
the (non-resistant)wild-type (Microbiological resistance). Secondly, by a level of 
antimicrobial activity(against said organism), that is associated with a high chance of 
therapeutic failure (Clinical resistance) [28].  
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This excludes organisms that are inherently resistant to an antibiotic or „non-
sensitive“. 
AMR can develop via different mechanims, such as natural selection of resistant 
strains by eradication of sensitive strain due to antibiotics. Induction of resistance 
could occour by the action of certains antibiotics (e.g.). Other resistance mechimisms 
occour due to transfer of genes, that code for AMR or by cross-contamination with 
resistant organisms. 
In any case, improper use of antibiotics has been linked to AMR, even though the 
mechanisms involved vary[100, 101].  
Whether or not an organism is resistant to an antibiotic can be determined by 
antibiotic susceptibility testing(AST). While there are a couple of different ASTs(e.g. 
mass spectometry or PCR), the most common method is the agar diffusion test. In 
this test, a bacterial culture is applied to a Mueller-Hinton agar, followed by the 
application of various antibiotics in disc form. The antibiotics diffuse into the agar, 
which is then incubated „overnight“ at 37°C  and will show two patterns of growth. 
„Zones of inhibition“ (translucent and transparent) are areas in which the antibiotic 
prevented bacterial growth either by stoping growth in the first place or killing the 
organisms. The more effective the antibiotic, the larger the zone of inhibition. This 
can be either due to an increased sensitivity or increased dosing of the antibiotic. 
The other areas (only translucent) show bacterial growth and if they extend 
completely around an antibiotic disc, indicate, that the bacterium is non-sensitive (or 
resistant) to that antibiotic. 
With AST, a clinician is able to detect resistances and use specific antibiotics in 
treating an infection instead of using a broad-spectrum antibiotics(e.g. targeted 
treatment vs. empirical treatment ), that themselves are a common cause of 
emerging resistances[102]. 
Ideally, surveillance of AMR should occur at regular intervals on hospital, regional, 
national and international levels and hospitals should enable education about local 
AMR-strains.   
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Examples of AMR-strains, that are commonly responsible for HCAIs are methicilin-
resistant Staphylococcus areus, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus(esp. E. 
faecium), carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae(esp. Klepsiella 
pneumoniae), carbapenem resistant Acinetobacter, carbapenem-resistant 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, macrolide and penicillin-resistant Streptococcus 
pneumoniae[102]. The prevalence of these organisms is displayed in chapter 2.3. .  
 
3.4.4.  Antimicrobial stewardship & Antibiotic policies 
In order to implement and monitor interventions targeting the use of antimicrobials, 
so called antimicrobial stewardship programmes are part of HCAI prevention. 
  
The programmes can contain guidelines, education programmes, automatic stop 
orders, IT-support systems for therpeutic decisionmaking, improved antimicrobial 
order forms and much more[28]. 
Antibiotic policies on the other hand are a straight-forward approach, that limits the 
availability of certain antibiotics in order to control prescription. This is done by 
establishing a formulary, that restricts the range of antibiotics stocked in the local 
pharmacy. So when an antibiotic is prescribed, a specialist (medical microbilogist or 
pharmacist) needs to authorize it’s use[28]. Even though this greatly impacts 
(inappropriate) prescribing patterns and expenses for antibiotics, this approach 
warrants the increased use of other infection control measures and should only be 
implemented after a reasonable amount of intelligence in that area has been 
collected. Furthermore, it can produce situations in which inexperienced clinicians 
overuse the same antibiotic instead of an alternative, and thus risk inducing AMR. 
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3.5. Evaluating the impact of a prevention programme 
At the end of a (prevention programme) cycle, the ICC (under the lead of the DIPC) 
has to evaluate the efficacy of the steps taken.  
 
This has to happen in regular intervals (quarter-annual, semi-annual or annual), that 
are appropriate for the size of the hospital/region etc. and should focus on four major 
aspects: 
1. Is the surveillance strategy fitting? 
2. Is feedback appropriate? 
3. Quality indicators 
4. Impact 
To evaluate, weather or not a strategy is appropriate, a questionnaire for all HCWs 
could provide valuable insight into compliance with the system[109]. Does data 
collection happen in a timely manner or is the additional workload a negative factor 
for adherence to the prevention strategies? Do HCWs understand the necessity and 
utility of a programme or do they rate (potential/factual) impacts low? Do all wards 
participate and cooperate with each other? 
These are just a few examples of how an ICC could assess a successful surveillance 
strategy. 
“Feedback” basically refers to the collected, analyzed and reported data and is a core 
part of surveillance. Evaluation of feedback should focus on two major points: 
methodology and quality. Is the data, collected from individual patients, appropriately 
coded to ensure confidentiality? Is the time period in which feedback is processed 
appropriate to ensure representative data and timely/adequate education of HCWs?  
Is the data complete or are patients/wards missing?  Does the data provide 
adequate/useful sensitivity, specificity and predictive values? 
 
Or simply said: “Do the methods of feedback acquisition yield data of high quality?” 
Analyzing trends in quality indicators or SPIs (see Footnote in 3.) provides a direct 
measurement of infection control capabilites.  Improving SPIs is somewhat the 
responsibility of the administration, as it has to improve the infrastructure (isolation/ 
single-bed rooms/ alcohol dispencers etc.) and hire infection control professionals, so 
trends in SPIs can highlight weather or not the administration adequately participates 
in the prevention programme.  
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Finally, the impact of a prevention programme has to be determined. Impact can be 
measured in various ways (e.g. mortality, morbidity, additional days of hospitalisation, 
treatment costs, DDD, infection rates, relative risks, etc…) via different sorts of 
studies (e.g. Prevalence study, incidence study or targeted surveillance reports) but 
in general serves as a source to observe trends and provide an all-encompasing 
picture of success and failure of a programme. 
These impact studies also provide an evidence-based baseline for the next cycle of 
prevention and conclude the evaluation process as a whole.  
 
4. Discussion 
Healthcare-associated infections have been recognized as a major problem in 
European healthcare for the past two decades. While investigating, the ECDC has 
undergone major structural changes, which have impacted its modus operandi and 
reach. These changes make it challenging to review the data available, as the 
surveillance only covers a part of the EU/EEA countries at times (and seldom “all”- as 
the number of EU & ECDC member states has been changing in the meantime). To 
add to the problem, the submitted data have had some various differences in sample 
size and quality, rendering a direct international comparison actually impossible 
without making daring assumptions. 
Another issue that the author encountered, was the different times of surveillance 
between the observed sectors (acute care hospitals, ICUs, LTCFs and SSI). While 
this seems like a minor issue, it makes analysis somewhat complicated if viewed 
against the background of the ever-changing ECDC structures and formats of 
reporting. This becomes especially apparent when certain variables (e.g. SPIs or 
microbiological data) are available in some studies [12], while lacking in others [11], 
or some data are present in multiple publications, but vary from one another (e.g. 
data about HCAI-type prevalence and PSIs in LTCF) [10,11]. Furthermore, it  
appears that  European surveillance (as of now) does not happen at regular intervals 
(annually), as the ECDC intended. It seems that the surveillance has not been 
harmonized to a point which would enable regular, uniform evaluation of the HCAI 
problem and the solutions for it. This ultimately becomes apparent, when one 
considers that there are no recent, clear values for the overall prevalence of HCAI on 
a European level.   
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The ECDC acknowledged some (international comparison, missing/ incomplete data, 
small sample sizes) of these problems in virtually all the PPS observed during this 
review and continues to work on improving the situation [10,11,12,13]. 
Another important topic is the lack of uniform guidelines for the use of antimicrobials. 
While these are present in veterinary medicine, human medicine is found wanting of 
such direly-needed guidelines. Observing prevalence of antibiotic prophylaxis in SSIs 
or LTCF would be more valuable if the observer knew what kind of regimen the 
patients were on. The same applies to treatment of SSI or ICU patients. With AMR 
increasing overall and newly-resistant strains of bacteria (e.g. Clostridium spp.) 
appearing, the current and especially the next generations of doctors should have a 
tool to guide them away from using broad-spectrum antibiotics, thus potentially 
inducing resistance  and to ensure treatment equality across Europe. 
 
Acknowledging this, the European prevalence seems to be somewhere around 7.6% 
[110,111] as of 2008. When looking at acute care hospitals (6% prevalence), the 
most common HCAIs were Pneumonia (23.5%), SSIs (19.6%), UTIs (19%) and BSIs 
(10.7%). 
With the exception of BSIs, this seems to be a fairly homogenous distribution. 
 The most common microorganisms causing HCAIs in acute care hospitals were 
E.coli (15.9%), S. aureus (12.3%), Enterococcus spp. (9.6%), Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa (8.9%), Klebsiela spp. (8.7%) and C.difficile (54.%) all together 
accounting for over half of the HCAIs observed. 
Concerning PSIs in acute care hospitals, the mean alcohol handrub consumption 
was 23.9 liters/1000 patient days (highest in tertiary, lowest in primary hospitals) with 
a median of 18.7. About 25% of hospital bedrooms were single-bed rooms. The 
median number of full-time employed infection control nurses was 1 per 250 patient 
beds, which significantly decreased with hospital size, but was relatively stable 
regardless of the hospital type. The latter has to be taken with caution, as these are 
mean values and the actual number of nurses in this regard can be either zero, one, 
two or more. But 1 per 250 beds is in line with the standard [12,31]. The median 
number of full-time employed infection control doctors was even lower, with 0.36 per 
250 beds.  
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Italy, Spain and Cyprus were the only countries observed that had a medium number 
around 1, which is interesting in itself, as these countries have an above-average 
HCAI prevalence rate (and would therefore be more likely to have a lower number of 
ICDs).  
This begs to investigate the impact of ICD on HCAI prevalence. There was no 
significant relationship between the number of ICDs per beds and hospital size or 
level [12]. Seen as a whole, the data about HCAI in acute care hospitals are the most 
detailed data the ECDC has produced in this area.  
 
They include data from over 30 countries and are very representative for the 
healthcare sector Europe and it should therefore come as no surprise, that the ECDC 
uses these data (the most) in order to provide a picture of the HCAI situation in 
Europe (even though the data don’t actually do that, as they don’t include LTCFs for 
example). 
 
For intensive care units, the prevalence lies somewhere between 11.7% (for 
Pneumonia, BSIs and UTIs together) and 19.5% (for Pneumonia, LRTI, UTI, SSI, 
BSI, systemic infection, GI-infection, skin and soft-tissue infection and others). While 
this is a wide range (and should therefore be viewed with caution), the prevalence 
surpasses both the European mean as well as the mean of all other sectors, even at 
its lowest value. Of note, the higher value comes from the point prevalence study of 
acute care hospitals [12], which included data from 30 countries (compared with 15 
countries [11]), which makes it more representative on a European level. It seems 
likely that the HCAI prevalence of the added countries was disproportionately high. 
Looking at the highest-ranking countries in HCAI prevalence, this seems to have 
been the case, as Iceland, Denmark, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia all have an above-average HCAI prevalence. But one 
has to assume that the HCAI prevalence in acute care hospitals directly correlates 
with the HCAI prevalence in the ICU (of the same observed hospitals). This is a huge 
assumption to make, especially since the PPS points out that “The PPS protocol did 
not distinguish between HAIs associated with staying in the ICU and HAIs associated 
with staying in another hospital ward or hospital.” [12]. The distribution of 
patient/consultant specialty by country [12] confirms that there is no direct correlation 
in this case. 
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Of all observed ICU patients, 5.3% acquired pneumonia. The infection was device- 
associated in 92% and frequently observed organisms were P. aeruginosa, S.aureus 
(43% MRSA), Klebsiella and E.coli. 
3% suffered from BSI, of which 43.3% were catheter-related and 47.4% secondary to 
another infection (mostly pulmonary and gastrointestinal). The most common 
organisms were coagulase-negative streptococci, Enterococcus spp., S.aureus, 
Klebsiella and Pseudomonas. 
Another 3.1% acquired a UTI and in 96.7% this was device-associated. The most 
common organisms were Enterococcus spp. and E.coli. 
The high HCAI prevalence in ICUs can be readily be explained by multiple factors. 
For one, adherence to hygiene guidelines has been repeatedly proven to be very 
poor [58, 59, 60]. For another, the frequent usage of invasive devices significantly 
increases the risk of acquiring an infection. Added to these are factors like workload, 
understaffing and their associated time constraints. Some of these factors are difficult 
to control/improve, because invasive devices are commonly used in daily ICU 
practice or because of economic constraints of a hospital. But hand hygiene might be 
the factor with the highest potential of improvement - given the right incentives. 
 
The crude HCAI prevalence in long-term care facilities was found to be 3.4% with the 
most common HCAIs being RTIs (31.2%), UTIs (31.2%) and skin infections (22.8%) 
[10]. 
About 66% of LTCFs had at least one infection control specialist. 71.3% of these had 
at least one ICN, 23.3% had both an ICD & ICN and 5.4% only one ICD. An ICC was 
in place in 42.6% and about 80% of institutions reported  having access to an 
external ICC.  
76.4% of LTCF reported not having an antimicrobial stewardship programme and 
only one participating LCTF in Malta had a surveillance programme. 
Almost a hundred percent reported having written hand hygiene protocols, but 
reported that only 56.2% used alcohol-based handrubs frequently. The mean alcohol 
handrub consumption was 4.2L per 1000 resident days. 
At this point it has to be acknowledged that the entire HALT-2 PPS suffers from 
multiple issues. First, it included data from only 19 countries (with 9 of them providing 
poor data). Furthermore, the sample sizes per country varied massively between 32 
(Denmark) and 211 (Germany) - excluding countries with poor data.  
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To add insult to injury, 50% of participating LTCFs were in three countries (Germany, 
Italy and Ireland), shifting the validity of the observed data even more. 
The low volume of data sources itself makes these numbers very unreliable and they 
are inadequate to give sufficiently potent indications of HCAIs in LTCF on a 
European level.  
 
Concerning surgical-site infections, the ECDC  collected detailed data between 2008 
and 2011, which allow for a more than adequate analysis of the different types of 
surgeries. 
Of note, data has been submitted by 16 countries with Germany, France and the UK 
supplying 78.5% of the data. This, again, leads to a selection bias in which three 
countries determine (statistically) the outcome of the prevalence data for Europe. 
 
Nevertheless, the mean European SSI prevalence lies somewhere between 0.8% 
and 9.5% and it is questionable if a “true” European mean value for SSIs can be 
achieved by looking at the 7 most common types of surgeries in only half of EU/EEA 
countries, on top of the aforementioned selection bias. This is probably the reason 
why the ECDC has not given a definite European mean value in the first place. 
For this review, the author has chosen to look at the surgeries with the highest CI of 
SSIs, namely colon surgery (9.5%), coronary artery bypass graft (3.5%) and 
Caesarean section (2.9%). 
 
Data for colon surgery were stratified into “open” (non-endoscopic) and “closed” 
(endoscopic) procedures. It was shown that the CI of SSI was 7.1% for closed and 
10.6% for open procedures. Furthermore, the surgery profile showed a lower case-
fatality, lower percentage of contaminated operations and shorter post-operative stay 
period with a higher percentage of antibiotic prophylaxis for open procedures than for 
closed surgeries.  
Closed procedures had a significantly lower rate of urgent operations (6.8% vs. 
18.5%)[13]. 
While these data invite embracing closed procedures as the “gold standard” for colon 
surgery, one has to appreciate the fact that closed procedures are significantly more- 
commonly performed in emergency situations (almost thrice as much). This has 
multiple implications. 
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First, as emergency situations are by definition more stressful for the operator, they 
open up a window for potential contamination (similar to the phenomenon observed 
in ICUs). Secondly, these emergency patients are unstable (or at least more unstable 
than a patient undergoing an elective procedure) and might therefore be 
immunocompromised or already contaminated (e.g. due to gastric perforation). 
Lastly, the question has to be asked whether or not closed procedures could be used 
more often in emergency situations. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence that supports the preference of endoscopic 
over open procedures. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the bacteria involved in this category of SSI were 
Enterobacteriaceae (47.3%) and Enterococcus spp. (19.6%). 
The post-operative stay period was about 2 weeks, regardless of the procedure type 
and 80% of SSIs in this category were diagnosed within that time. This seems to 
indicate that the post-operative stay period is optimally timed to allow for early 
detection and treatment of HCAI.  
With the highest CI of SSI, reduction of infections in colon surgery has to be a prime 
concern. Germany and France have the lowest rates of these infections and because 
they supply the absolute majority of data anyway, it would be adequate to investigate 
their clinical guidelines for colon surgery and post-operative patient care. 
 
SSIs in coronary artery bypass grafts had a CI of 3.5%,  the most common type 
being superficial incisional SSI. Of note, the second largest group of causative 
organisms was Enterobacteriaceae, which accounted for almost a quarter of 
infections in this type of surgery. This becomes more interesting, if one is considers 
that contamination was reported in only 0.2% of recorded surgeries and that 
antibiotic prophylaxis was given in 98.1%. This raises the question of how 
Enterobacteriaceae get into the wound. 
There are several possibilities. For one, as the infection is most likely to be superficial 
and 62% of cases get diagnosed within the average post-operative stay period (11 
days) in the hospital, the contamination of the wound could have been caused as a 
result of unclean plaster change. Another reason could be that contamination during 
surgery is underreported or that glove-puncture [91,92] happens more frequently 
during this kind of surgery (and is not being reported as contamination as such [18]).  
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It should also be kept in mind that this kind of operation usually takes more than 3 
hours. This causes three problems: Firstly, 18-35% (percentage increasing with time) 
of gloves become unsterile as micro-damage to the gloves causes them to become 
permeable for bacteria and this is not recognized in 80% of cases [18]. Secondly, 
residual bacterial colonies on the surgeon’s hands can “re-grow”, increasing 
contamination linearly over time [49]. 
 
 Lastly, changing gloves during the procedure is not uncommon for this kind of 
surgery  and this practice, although aimed at reducing the chance of contamination 
through permeable micro-damage, can itself lead to contamination with (e.g. 
airborne) bacteria or organisms from the hands of the scrub nurse (or whatever 
assistant aids the doctor in glove-change). Especially, since it is mostly (if not only) 
the surgeon, whochanges gloves after some time. 
An insight into the antibiotic regimen used could provide valuable information about 
whether or not enterobacteriaceae were considered. Interestingly, about 10% of data 
had to be excluded from the surveillance analysis because the infections were 
reported after the 30-day cut-off.  
 
Combined with the fac, that the average CABG patient remains in the hospital for 
about 2 weeks, (a time in which about 60% of SSIs are recognized/diagnosed), it 
seems that a significant part of the other 40% of  infections, as well as up to an 
additional 10%  were contracted outside the hospital. 
This could suggest that the problem of post-operative infection in CABG patients is 
equally a matter of HCAI, as it might be one of community-acquired infection. 
 
Caesarian sections had a CI of SSI of 2.9% with almost 90% being superficial 
incisional infections. Interestingly, 84% of SSIs were detected after discharge. This 
might be connected to the fact that C-sections have a short post-operative stay 
period of about a week. Unfortunately, only 8% of SSIs in this category were 
microbiologically confirmed and therefore, no conclusive results can be drawn from 
the organisms that have been found, nor can these be compared to the antimicrobial 
prophylaxis  given (keeping in mind that there are no European guidelines for 
antibiotic usage). 
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Overall, the most common type of SSI in all three kinds of surgery was superficial 
incisional SSI. The infection was proven to be most commonly caused by a single 
organism. Furthermore, Enterobacteriaciae and Gram-positive cocci were the 
predominant microorganisms in all three kinds. Germany and France showed low CIs 
for all three kinds of surgery and because they supplied almost half of the data 
observed (see above), a look into their surgery guidelines could provide insight into 
why this is the case. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Healthcare-associated infections affect over 4 million patients in Europe each year. 
The ECDC has taken many steps to improve patient care by collecting surveillance 
data across Europe to identify key areas and provide educational material for 
healthcare workers and patients alike. 
But the enormous size and reach of such an international organisation makes the 
ECDC slow in providing regularly-updated, high-quality data. In the end, it can only 
be successful if its member states supply for analysis the data necessaryto provide 
the foundation for Europe-wide prevention programmes. As of now, many countries 
still supply poor data, whether because of lack of funds or because of non-adherence 
to harmonized working protocols. 
But the number of national and international programmes is increasing; especially in 
light of increasing antimicrobial resistance, it is realized that improved prevention and 
guidelines for antibiotics is preferable to waiting for a novel antibiotic to save the day.  
Prevention programmes enable every level of healthcare to act against the spread 
and persistence of healthcare-associated infections. Members of infection control 
teams, specialized in limiting risk factors and transmission, work amongst their 
colleagues and can provide them with valuable guidance. Hospital administration 
staff who are members of an infection control committee can acquire crucial 
knowledge about infection transmission from a specialist, that might lead to changes 
in  hospital structure. 
 
Such changes may range from simply improving the distribution of hand-rub 
dispensers over increased staffing to improving the infrastructure of a hospital as a 
whole.  
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But also every member of staff, be it a doctor or a janitor, can acquire knowledge of 
how they themselves can improve their performance in order to minimize the risk of 
HCAIs. 
While the data about HCAI in long-term care facilities is too poor to make reasonable 
statements about it, the data for acute-care hospitals and ICUs in particular is more 
than sufficient.  
Unfortunately, the situation in ICUs seems dire. Two of every 10 patients acquire an 
infection in the ICU and if this fact alone isn’t reason for concern, the fact that these 
infections come from their healthcare-providers is, regardless of whether it is due to 
bad hygiene practices during a stressful job or because of invasive devices. There 
are plenty of areas where prevention programmes can be put in place and maybe it 
requires stronger policies to drastically reduce infection rates in the ICU. 
Leaving ICUs and surgery aside, other hospital wards and specialties have a quite 
equal distribution of HCAIs.  Pneumonia, catheter-related UTIs and BSIs are the top 
offenders and all of them have an overwhelming rate of device-association (in the 
90th percentile!).  
This means the devices themselves must be improved, but also the standard for 
sterility when working with these devices must be raised. 
Surgical-site infections are on a decreasing trend. Even though colon surgery poses 
the biggest risk for infection in surgery, it has been recognized that there is a realistic 
chance of decreasing infection rates significantly by using endoscopes instead of 
open procedures.  
In the end, there are still a lot of open questions and most of them won’t be answered 
within the next decade. Until then, putting maximum effort into preventing the spread 
of healthcare-associated infections should be on the mind of every healthcare 
worker. 
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